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COMMENT
EMINENT DOMAIN -PROCEEDINGS
-USE

To ASSESS COMPENSATION

OF COMMISSIONS IN FEDERAL CONDEMNATION ACTIONS.

In a condemnation action brought by the United States, a commission was appointed by the district court to determine the issue
of just compensation pursuant to Rule 71A (h) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.' The report submitted by the commission to
the court listed only a dollar figure of "Damages Assessed" for each
tract of land involved. The United States objected that the report
was inadequate, whereupon it was apparently informally returned
to the commission. A supplemental report, which set out more
fully the conclusions of the commission, was then filed. The district2
court adopted the reports over the objection of the United States.
On review the Supreme Court of the United States held the reports
to be inadequate because they did not show the reasoning used by
the commission in arriving at its conclusions; no sufficient basis
existed upon which to decide whether the reports were "clearly
erroneous" within the meaning of Rule 53 (e) (2); and detailed instructions as to the commission's duties should have been given by
the district court. United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192 (1964).
[A]ny party may have a trial by
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A(h): "TRIAL....
jury of the issue of just compensation by filing a demand therefor within
the time allowed for answer or within such further time as the court may
fix, unless the court in its discretion orders that, because of the character,
location, or quantity of the property to be condemned, or for other reasons
in the interest of justice, the issue of compensation shall be determined by
a commnission of three persons appointed by it. If a commission is appointed
it shall have the powers of a master provided in subdivision (c) of Rule 53
and proceedings before it shall be governed by the provisions of paragraphs
(1) and (2) of subdivision (d) of Rule 53. Its action and report shall be
determined by a majority and its findings and report shall have the effect,
and be dealt with by the court in accordance with the practice, prescribed
in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Rule 53 .... "
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (c): "PowERs.... Subject to the specifications and
limitations stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise the power
to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and
take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his
duties under the order. He may require the production before him of evidence upon all matters embraced in the reference, including the production
of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings applicable thereto.
He may rule upon the admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed
by the order of reference and has the authority to put witnesses on oath
and may himself examine them and may call the parties to the action and
examine them upon oath. When a party so requests, the master shall make
a record of the evidence offered and excluded in the same manner and
subject to the same limitations as provided in Rule 43(c) for a court sitting
without a jury."
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (d) of Rule 53 deal with time
and place of meetings and powers to subpoena witnesses and punish for
contempt.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e) : "REPORT. . . . (2) In Non-Jury Actions. In an
action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the master's findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous . . . . The court after hearing may adopt
the report or may modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or may
receive further evidence or may recommit it with instructions."
2 In affirming, the Court of Appeals for The Tenth Circuit held: (1) findings as to the amount of the award must be accepted on appeal if such
are within the range of conflicting testimony and not "clearly erroneous";
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Under the provisions of the general condemnation statute, s
before the adoption of Rule 71A, it was the practice in federal
condemnation suits to conform to the procedure of the state in
which such actions were brought, 4 with two exceptions. 5 This practice continued after the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, since no rule specifically governed condemnation.6 However, experience showed the need for a uniform rule relating to
federal proceedings in eminent domain.7 The result of this need
was the subsequent adoption of Rule 71A,8 which became effective
August 1, 1951.
The purpose of Rule 71A is to displace local conformity in
favor of national uniformity by a single standard in federal con(2) whether such a report is sufficiently comprehensive to provide a basis
for review depends upon the nature of the matter involved; and (3) thcommission's general findings were sufficient in view of the uncomplicated
nature of the issues and evidence heard. United States v. Merz, 306 F.2d
39 (10th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 192 (1964).
3 Act of August 1, 1888, c. 728, § 2, 25 Stat. 357.
4Ibid.; United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1948);
Comparet v. United States, 164 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1947); United States
v. A Certain ,Tract of Land, 72 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1934) ; 7 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 2709, 2716 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. California v. United States, 169 F.2d
914 (9th Cir. 1948); Nebraska v. United States, 164 F.2d 866 (8th Cir.
1947), cert denied, 334 U.S. 815 (1948) (prior to adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P.
71A (h), what constitutes property and what is just compensation in condemnation by United States not question of state law but of federal law);
United States v. Kansas City, Kansas, 159 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1946)
(appeal by the government from order in condemnation proceedings governed by federal law under former Rule 81 (a) (7), prior to adoption of Rule
71A); Murphy v. United States, 145 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 891 (1945); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
5 Condemnation proceedings under Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat.
70 (1933), 16 U.S.C. § 831x (1958) ; and acquisition by the District of
Columbia, D.C. CODE, §§ 16-619 to 16-144 (1961).
6 The inherent power of the Federal Government to condemn and acquire
property in its own right was firmly established by Kohl v. United States,
91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875). By the Condemnation Act, supra note 3, Congress
gave the federal courts jurisdiction in federal condemnation cases and
provided that the procedure in such cases conform as nearly as possible to
state practices.
7 Nealy, Rule 71A (h) in Federal Condemnation Proceedings, 23 FED. B.J.
45, 47, 48 (1963) ; 7 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 4 at 2717, 2744.
8
Supra note 1.
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demnation proceedings." Since local conformity had been the practice in federal condemnation actions, there was necessarily an
absence of uniform authority on the many procedural problems
-raised by the promulgation of Rule 71A. 10 There are few cases
which bear upon the procedure to be followed by a commission
during its hearings and, prior to Merz, apparently none dealing
directly with the kind and extent of instructions to be given the
commission by the court. Early cases suggested that the commission
should not follow the exclusionary rules of evidence but should
hear all evidence offered, preserve it in the record, indicate what
use, if any, had been made of the evidence, and allow the court to
rule later on such matters.1 Merz clarifies commission procedure
by enumerating certain minimum standards to be followed by the
court in instructing a commission. 12 Instructions should be given
on the method of conducting the hearing, including instructions on
the kind of evidence that is admissible and the manner of ruling
on it. The court should explain in detail the qualifications of expert
witnesses, the weight to be given other opinion evidence, what is
9 United States v. Merchants Matrix Cut Syndicate, 219 F.2d 90, 93 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955); United States v. Wallace, 201 F.2d
65, 67 (10th Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
10 One of the problems encountered by district judges in applying the rule
has been that of deciding when to appoint a commission. It was the apparent
intention of the draftsmen of the rule that commissions should be used
only in exceptional and extraordinary cases and where, because of peculiar
circumstances, jury trial was inadvisable. 7 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 2711, 2790, 2797. But widespread, sometimes indiscriminate, use of commissions has been the practice in many areas. Nealy, supra note 7 at 46.
For representative cases concerning reference to commissions, see United
States v. Leavell & Ponder, Inc., 286 F.2d 398, 407, 409 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 944 (1961); United States v. Hall, 274 F.2d 856, 858 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960); Cunningham v. United States, 270
F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 989 (1960); United States
v. Vater, 259 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Buhler, 254
F.2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Bobinski, 244 F.2d 299
(2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Theimer, 199 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1952);
United States v. Wallace, 201 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1952).
Some other problems encountered in the use of commissions are indicated in the following cases: Unwarranted use of masters is an "effective
way of putting a case to sleep for an indefinite period." LaBuy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 253, n. 5 (1957). See United States v. Bobinski,
supra at 301, saying, "Certainly the misadventures of this case . . . do
not speak well for a course substantially repudiated in the state as well
as federal procedure."
" . . . [T]he appointment of the 'commission created far more problems
than it solved, problems that ultimately required the court to perform a
painful salvage operation in order to dispose of the case." United States v.
Vater, supra at 671.
" . . . [A]mong other things a reference to a commission tends unduly
to prolong the proceedings, thereby causing vexation to all concerned and
additional expense, in this instance to the government for accruing interest."
United States v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 264 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1959);
see United States v. 44.00 Acres of Land, 234 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Interest does not accrue on that portion of the value of condemned propto the Declaration of Taking
erty that is deposited with the court pursuant
2
Act, 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 58a (1958).)
11 United States v. Cunningham, 246 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1957); see United
States v. Southerly Portion of Bodie Island, 19 F.R.D. 313 (E.D.N.C. 1956)
(within discretion of commission whether to rule on admissibility of evidence unless instructed otherwise by court).
12 United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 198 (1964).

1964

COMMENT

competent evidence of value, and the best evidence of value.
Examples illustrating severance damages should be given, and the
right to view the property and the limited purpose of viewing
should be explained.'5 Rules 71A (h) and 53(e) (2) provide that
the commission shall make a report to the district court, which will
review the commission's findings
of fact in accordance with the
"clearly erroneous" standard.' 4 To what extent the report, as a basis
for the court's review, should state specific subsidiary findings of
fact has been in conflict. Decisions in several- circuits recognized the
need for specific findings but did not set forth any uniform standard to be used.' 5 In two Fifth Circuit cases commission reports
were rejected as inadequate for review because they neither showed
how the commission resolved conflicts in testimony nor made any
findings as to particular benefits.16 But other decisions established
a lesser standard for report comprehensiveness.' 7 Merz indicates
Is Ibid.
14 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); See
note 1 supra.
15 Louis Gill & Sons v. United States, 313 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Lewis, 307 F.2d 453, 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v.
2872.88 Acres in Clay and Quitman Counties, 310 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. granted, 372 U.S. 975 (1963) (decided with the principal case) ; United
States v. Carroll, 304 F.2d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Leavell & Ponder, Inc., 286 F.2d 398, 406 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 366 U.S.
944 (1961) ; United States v. 2477.79 Acres in Bell County, 259 F.2d 23, 29
(5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Cunningham, 246 F.2d 330, 333 (4th Cir.
1957) ; United States v. Bobinski, 244 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1957) ; United States
v. 44.00 Acres of Land, 234 F.2d 410, 411, 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1956) ; United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadelphia, 215 F.2d 140, 142, 144
(3d Cir. 1954).
16 United States v. 2872.88 Acres in Clay and Quitman Counties, supra note
15; United States v. 2477.79 Acres in Bell County, supra note 15. (Report
inadequate for review which showed no basis for resolving conflicts in
testimony before commissioners).
17 United States v. Lewis, 307 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Cunningham, 246 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1957) (report sufficient though it did
not show the "path" taken through the evidence); United States v. 3065.94
Acres of Land, 187 F.Supp. 728 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (commission report not
required to tell what use was made of testimony or what facts were considered by commission); United States v. Southerly Portion of Bodie Island,
19 F.R.D. 313 (E.D.N.C. 1956) (since commission chairman was a lawyer,
court assumed its instructions had been followed though no such showing
made in report); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Warren
County, 90 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Va. 1949) (report not to be interfered with
unless prejudice, corruption, or clear mistake of law or fact appears).
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that commissioners should be instructed on the kind of report to
be filed and what kind of findings should be included.18 Though
the findings do not have to be as detailed as would those made by
a judge trying a case without a jury, they must reveal at a minimum the reasoning used in deciding on the award, the standards
followed, the testimony believed, and the measure of severance
damages used. 19
The Merz decision, while recognizing that commissions may be
utilized advantageously, 20 should curtail the "free-wheeling" tendency of commissioners to use their own expertise instead of acting
merely as a "deliberative body applying constitutional standards. "
Left largely unsettled are the problems created by the provision
in Rule 53 (e) (2) allowing courts to adopt, modify, or reject reports in whole or in part, or to receive further evidence, or to recommit them to the commission in whole or in part with instructions. Obviously the court has wide discretion in deciding which of
these courses of action to follow and may tailor its decision to the
facts of the case. The admonition that the court "shall accept the
master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous" is open to
several possible interpretations. Courts in non-condemnation cases
have sometimes treated a master's findings as advisory only and
have not felt bound by a master's conclusions of law. 22 This treat-

ment has carried over somewhat into condemnation cases. As one
court viewed the matter:
It was; the purpose of the rule, where there is a trial
without a jury, to place 'ultimate responsibility for the findings of fact upon the judge. Where there has been a reference to a master, the master's findings are entitled to
special weight because he has seen and heard the witnesses
but they are not given the effect of a verdict by a jury.
The language of the rule is that the court shall accept the
master's findings unless clearly erroneous. This is manifestly a guide to be followed in the exercise of the discretion vested in the District Judge, not a limitation upon his
power ....23
The Supreme Court has said "a finding is 'clearly erroneous'
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed." 24 Here the Court was talking
about an appellate court's review of a lower court decision under
Rule 52 (a). In condemnation proceedings some courts have applied
the rule in a somewhat narrower fashion. Thus it has been stated
that the district court should determine whether the commission
has followed the instructions of the court as to admissibility and
18 376 U.S. at 198.
19 Id. at 198.
20 Id. at 197.
21 Id.at 198.
22 D.M.W. Contracting Co. v. Stolz, 158 F.2d 405, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947); ef. United States v. Waymire, 202 F.2d 550,

553 (10th Cir. 1953).

23
24

.

United States v. Twin City Power Co., 248 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958).
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
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consideration of testimony offered and decide whether it has
25
overstepped its guidelines and prerogatives in this respect.
But as stated by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the report should be adopted unless it is "clearly erroneous" in whole
or in part based on substantial error in the proceedings; 26 or, based
upon a misapplication of controlling law; 2 7 or, because it is not
supported by substantial evidence; 2 or, because-it is contrary to
the clear weight of the evidence.2 9 It has also been stated that a
district court may not reject a commission report merely because
it disagrees with the result reached or would have personally
decided differently on the evidence presented.8 0
Once a report or a portion thereof has been rejected as "clearly erroneous," the court is faced with the problem of deciding what
course of action will bring the case to a fair and rapid conclusion.
Much confusion has resulted from the interpretation of Rule
53 (e) (2) to provide the court with power to modify the master's
findings. The United States has consistently contended that modification by the court without further proceedings may be exercised,
if at all, only to a very limited degree. It points out the difference
between the findings of the commission and its report. Findings
are made on the basis of testimony given before the commission by
witnesses whose credibility it was able to judge first-hand. The
United States' contention is that the commission report, and the reUnited States v. 10064.97 Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 393 (D. Wyo. 1952).
(10th Cir. 1953). See United
States v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 154 F. Supp. 770, 775 (M.D. Pa. 1957); cf.
I-XL Eastern Furniture Co. v. Holly Hill Lumber Co., 134 F. Supp. 343
(E.D.S.C. 1955).
27 United States v. Waynire, supra note 26 at 553.
25

26 United States v. Waymire, 202 F.2d 550, 553

28

Ibid.

30 United States v. Rainwater, 325 F.2d 62, 66 (8th Cir. 1963) ; United States

v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 154 F. Supp. 770, 775 (M.D. Pa. 1957). See United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 253 F.2d 197, 203 (5th Cir. 1958), wherein
the court states: "[The clearly erroneous] ... burden is especially strong
when the commission has viewed and inspected the properties, or when
credibility is questioned and the commission has had the opportunity to see
and hear the witnesses, and is lighter when inferences for and deductions
from opinion evidence may be drawn as well by the district court Posby the
commission, and still lighter when the appellate court in turn reviews the
inferences drawn by the district court from the written transcript of evidence, though the 'clearly erroneous' rule is still applicable. (Citation omitted.)"
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port only, should be modified; and such modification may extend
31
only to the correction of an error of law.

If the court seeks to

make contrary findings there must be further proceedings either
before the court or before the commission. 32 The commission is
seen by the United States as an independent entity whose findings
ought to have at least the effect of those of a jury and should not
be overturned by a reviewing body. 3' This position has heretofore
received little support from the courts. Most courts have preferred
to allow more or less wide discretion in modification. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted the following position:
Although the Commission's findings of fact must be accepted by the district court unless they are clearly erroneous ....

the district court is authorized by the Rule to

modify or reject the Commission's findings in whole or in
part. We do not think the power to modify is to be narrowly construed or applied ....

The district court could have

rejected the Commission's findings had they been clearly
erroneous. Had this been done, the district court could
have substituted its own findings based upon the evidence
before the Commission .

. .

. We think the district court

could properly accept and approve the Commission's findings and modify and supplement
them by making further
34
findings from the evidence.
The same court found that witness credibility could be judged as
well by a district judge from the record as by members of a commission.3 5 The Drinciple that "one who decides must hear" renders
the wisdom of this pronouncement questionable.36 A seemingly
middle-of-the-road approach is taken by the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in a recent case wherein the court retreats from
the broad position previously adopted. 3T In United States v. Car3

roll,

that court states:
... [I] f there is evidence in the record before

8

...

[the

district judge] from which a correct ultimate decision can
be made and which does not involve a determination upon
conflicting testimony of questions of fact [Footnote omitted.] (as distinguished from a determination of an issue
the resolution of which depends on informed opinion and
judgment evidence), [the district judge may] make the
necessary determinations himself and enter final judgment
3 Brief for Appellant, pp. 13-17, United States v. Carroll, 304 F.2d 300 (4th

Cir. 1962) ; Reply brief for Appellant, pp. 4-7, United States v. Rainwater,
325 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Brief for Petitioner, pp. 26-30, United States
v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192 (1964).
32 Brief for Appellant, p. 40, United States v. Certain Lands in the City of
Statesboro, Docket No. 21039, 5th Cir., case presently pending.
33 Briefs cited note 31 supra.
34 United States v. Tampa Bay Garden Apartments, 294 F.2d 598, 603

(5tb
Cir. 1961).
a United States v. Twin City Power Co., 253 F.2d 197, 204 (5th Cir. 1958).
36 See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1935).
37 See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 248 F.2d 108, 112
(4th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958), wherein the former position
of this circuit is stated.
38 304 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1962).
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rather than remand the case for further proceedings before
the commission.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in United States
v. Rainwater,39 held that a judge was not permitted to substitute
his judgment for that of a commission and thereby increase the
award on the ground that it was inadequate. The case was remanded with direction to enter judgment in the amount awarded
by the commission. This seems to suggest that modification of the
award by the court is not proper. However, since the Court of
Appeals felt that the district court was wrong in finding the
report clearly erroneous, the case is questionable authority for the
proposition that a court may not modify. The majority opinion
suggests and the dissent states that a judge might hear additional
evidence and then nmodify the award in light of the record made
before the commission and the additional evidence. 40 It should be
kept in mind that the views stated in all the above cases were those
of courts considering commission reports prior to Merz, reports
that may have often been inadequate. Merz, however, does not
seem to support the United States' contention that the court should
remand with instructions to the commission, take additional evidence, or begin anew rather than resort to modification. The
Court authorizes modification and mentions several cases in which
modification of reports has been approved. 41 Merz qualified its
39
40

325 F.2d 62, 66 (8th Cir. 1963).

Id. at 67.

41376 U.S. at 200, nn. 5 & 6, referring to United States v. 44 Acres of Land,

234 F.2d 410, 414 (2d Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Carroll, 304 F.2d 300,
303 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Certain Interests in Property

296 F.2d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Twin City Power Co.,
248 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958). In
United States v. 44 Acres of Land, the Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit
says at page 414: "Rule 71A(h), together with Rule 53(e) (2) gave the
judge authority to reject, in part, a finding of the Commissioners if 'clearly
erroneous' and to modify their award accordingly. He was not obliged to,
although he had discretion to, remand their report to the Commissioners
for a revised finding." See also United States v. Twin City Power Co., 253
F.2d 197, 204 (5th Cir. 1958) (remand not necessary; protracted litigation
may be concluded by the court).
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approval of modification based on the existing record with the
language "in light of the exigencies of the particular case,"42 indicating that normal procedure should be to resubmit to the commission except in cases, such as those in which there has already been
extremely protracted litigation and one or more appeals, when
justice will be better accomplished by ending the case expeditiously.
Another question upon which Merz sheds some light is whether
the court of appeals reviews the report of the commission or the
judgment of the district court. Prior to Merz most courts held it
was the judgment of the district court and not the commission
report that was reviewed. 43 The Department of Justice now argues
that Merz rejects this position and holds that courts of appeal
review the findings of the commission just as the district court
does.44 The Supreme Court, after setting down its requirements
for adequate commission reports, stated:
If those procedures are followed and the District Court
adopts the report, as it may under Rule 53 (e) (2), the Court
of Appeals will have some guide lines to help it determine
whether the report is "clearly erroneous" within
the mean45
ing of Rule 53 (e) (2). (Emphasis supplied.)
That courts of appeal must review the commission report seems
manifest from a practical standpoint. While, technically, it is the
judgment entered by the district court from which an appeal is
taken,4 6 it would be difficult, if not impossible, for an appellate
tribunal to tell whether the district court's disposition of a commission report was correct unless it considered that report contemporaneously with the district court judgment.
Merz established certain minimum standards to which commissions must adhere, particularly with respect to the commission's
report to the court. But the opinion only suggests possible solutions
or alternatives to the problems of scope of review by district courts
and courts of appeal,- and procedures for remedial action when a
district court finds a commission report inadequate. It is still the
district court which has the ultimate responsibility for determining
the issue of just compensation, though it may choose a commission
as the means for making this determination. Merz emphasizes that
the court must exercise such supervision over a commission so as
to insure that its responsibility is not relinquished.
WILLIAM E. GANDY
42 376 U.S. at 200.
43 United States v. Twin City Power Co., 248 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958); Parks v. United States, 293 F.2d 482,
485 (5th Cir. 1961); see United States v. Benning, 330 F.2d 527, 530 (9th
Cir. 1964), wherein the court adhered to the stated rule but nevertheless
reviewed the commission report instead of remanding to the district court in
order to dispose of the case without prolonging the already lengthy litigation.
But cf. O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir.
1961), saying that the clearly erroneous standard was to be applied on

appeal to a referee's findings and not to those of the district court.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 35-38, United States v. Certain Lands in the City
of Statesboro, Docket No. 21439, 5th Cir., case presently pending.
45 376 U.S. at 199.
46See Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a).
44

